By Robert Barros
It's commonly believed that autocratic regimes can't restrict their strength via associations in their personal making. This booklet provides a shocking problem to this view. It demonstrates that the Chilean militia have been restricted through associations in their personal layout. in keeping with large documentation of army decision-making, a lot of it lengthy categorised and unavailable, this booklet reconstructs the politics of associations in the contemporary Chilean dictatorship (1973–1990). It examines the structuring of associations on the apex of the army junta, the connection of army rule with the earlier structure, the intra-military conflicts that resulted in the promulgation of the 1980 structure, the good judgment of associations inside the new structure, and the way the structure restricted the army junta after it went into strength in 1981. This provocative account unearths the traditional account of the dictatorship as a personalist regime with strength centred in Pinochet to be grossly faulty.
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Additional resources for Constitutionalism and Dictatorship: Pinochet, the Junta, and the 1980 Constitution
Example text
The principle that a single party cannot bind itself is discussed at length by Holmes (1988, 210–12), who also considers the democratic variants developed by Pufendorf and Rousseau to deny that popular sovereignty may be limited. 22 Dictatorship, Legality, Institutional Constraints that Hobbes describes,19 the concept of sovereignty appears to describe the structure of power in authoritarian regimes and to explain why such regimes cannot subject themselves to institutional limits. Before suggesting conditions under which institutional limits can be compatible with dictatorship, it is necessary to distinguish institutional limits from other forms of constraint, as well as from rule by law.
First, benefits expected to accrue from a course of action are insufficient to make a commitment credible. 27 In such instances, 26 27 The prisoner’s dilemma that arises when two parties commit to an exchange yet institutions for enforcing contracts are not available is the classic example that has focused the attention of new institutionalist economists. In this case, both parties may recognize that they each would gain from trade and agree to a trade, but when the time comes to actually exchange goods neither party has an incentive to follow through, since neither can be assured that the other will not cheat him.
Although modern dictatorships differ in important respects from the absolute monarchies 17 18 As mentioned, the contemporary literature on credible commitments restates this argument from a different theoretical perspective to argue that autocracies cannot effectively bind themselves. The principle that a single party cannot bind itself is discussed at length by Holmes (1988, 210–12), who also considers the democratic variants developed by Pufendorf and Rousseau to deny that popular sovereignty may be limited.